Lessons Learned: Donald Kohn by Haggerty, Maryann
Journal of Financial Crises 
Volume 2 Issue 3 
2020 
Lessons Learned: Donald Kohn 
Maryann Haggerty 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises 
 Part of the Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance Commons, Policy 
History, Theory, and Methods Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Haggerty, Maryann (2020) "Lessons Learned: Donald Kohn," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 2 : Iss. 3, 
964-968. 
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol2/iss3/50 
This Lessons Learned is brought to you for free and open access by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly 
Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Financial Crises by an authorized editor of 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact 
elischolar@yale.edu. 





By Maryann Haggerty 
Kohn, an economist, is a 40-year veteran of the Federal Reserve System. He served as a member 
of the Board of Governors, and was vice chair, from 2002-2010, which included the years of the 
global financial crisis (GFC). In that role, Kohn was also a voting member of the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) and was also was involved in the bailout of American International 
Group (AIG), the largest during the crisis. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with 
Kohn in March 2020, as the world was grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic. He discussed 
not only his experiences during the previous crisis, but also how policymakers were 
approaching the 2020 crisis. 
Leadership makes a difference—both negative and positive. 
Kohn spoke about the impact of leadership from different perspectives during the two crises. 
His reaction to the leadership at AIG was critical. He thought that the “less than stellar” AIG 
leadership greatly complicated the Fed’s efforts to assist it: 
What we didn’t know and what was very disappointing to me in my conversations 
with AIG executives, including the CEO in those few days over the weekend, was they 
didn’t have a very good sense of their own liquidity needs, and how they might 
develop over the coming weeks. They didn’t have a good sense of how they were going 
to get out of the mess, as I was reminded a few years ago when that court case was 
being adjudicated. 
In contrast, Kohn observed that the leaders in place on the government side—particularly 
Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Timothy Geithner at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, and Henry Paulson at the Treasury Department—showed great 
strength, led teams that coordinated closely, and produced efforts that proved effective 
against great odds and unprecedented challenges.  
Kohn also praised leadership at the Fed in 2020 for its quick and forceful response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic:    
Boy, I would say Jay Powell certainly has moved forcefully, quickly, adopted many of 
the things we did, but then expanded them to meet the needs of the time. The current 






Leaders must remain open to ideas from others. 
Among the unconventional policies the Fed pursued as the GFC unfolded was to purchase 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), the troubled financial assets at the root of the crisis, to 
support liquidity in that market. The idea for this asset-purchase program originated from 
the staff of the Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. “They wanted to go 
in and help restore market functioning, similar to what we’re seeing today,” Kohn 
recollected. Even though it seemed like an obvious and great idea, then it was outside of the 
Fed’s unusual purview. However, Kohn recalls that Chairman Bernanke and others were 
immediately open to exploring the idea:      
I think it’s a responsibility of the leadership of the organization to remain open to 
things that hadn’t been tried before and to listen with an open mind to people around 
them who are bringing these new ideas and to actively solicit the new ideas. One of 
the strengths of Ben Bernanke’s leadership was that he would send out what he called 
blue-sky emails, asking his colleagues and his staff for new ideas, different ideas.  
In a crisis situation, assume the worst and prepare for the worst.  
Reflecting on the nature of crises, Kohn counseled speedy, forceful action, “Try to head off 
the worst that can happen. Don’t wait for the markets and the commentary to catch up with 
you,” Kohn counseled.  
He recalled a conference in 2007, before the worst of the financial crisis had become 
apparent: 
I guess it must have been at Jackson Hole 2007; the focus of the discussion was moral 
hazard. At that time, in retrospect, we’d hardly done anything. We’d made the 
discount window cheaper. We’d encouraged people to borrow. Maybe we’d eased 
policy a little bit. Then, there was all this discussion that, “Oh my God, you’re creating 
moral hazard. There’s a Bernanke put, et cetera.” Ignore that, I guess would be the 
advice. Just go fast. Go hard. Go soon. Correct the moral hazard issues later with 
regulation like in Dodd-Frank. Don’t worry about it in the middle of the crisis. 
Learning from the past is important: The experiences of 2007-09 are helping 
policymakers as they face the crisis of 2020. 
In his writings and speeches, Kohn has outlined four broad lessons policymakers should take 
away from the experience of the global financial crisis. In his interview, he reflected on steps 
that have been taken to put those lessons into practice. 
1. Recognize the considerable effects that financial developments can have on the economy 
and the uncertainty that attends the economic outlook during periods of financial stress. 
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Kohn said, “in 2008, for most of the models we were using, the only thing that mattered was 
the federal funds rate, actual and expected. The model didn’t take into consideration a credit 
availability problem. Basically, they were looking through the financial sector to the real 
economy. What we learned was you can’t do that. You might be able to do that in peacetime, 
but you can’t do it in wartime.” 
In the years since, Kohn reflected, the Fed and outside economists have striven to see 
relationships between the financial sector and the rest of the economy more clearly. 
2. Be sufficiently aggressive in cutting the federal funds rate as financial conditions 
deteriorate. 
Kohn was supportive of the Fed’s actions to combat the COVID pandemic. He applauded their 
swift decisive movements, which were consistent with his general thinking on what should 
be done in a crisis: 
If the conditions are deteriorating, it’s better to cut it too much than too little. You can 
always take it back later. If inflation gets going, you can always act against that. 
There’s no limit on the upside of the policy variable of the federal funds rate. There’s 
just a limit on the downside. That asymmetry suggests that it’s better to be aggressive 
and try to cushion the economy from the really bad stuff happening, because once it 
happens, you’re really stuck, and then you’re with the unconventional policies. 
3. Use asset purchases to achieve additional accommodation when the capacity to cut 
policy rates does not provide a sufficient response to economic conditions, and do so with less 
concern about the associated risks. 
Kohn recalled that when the Fed started asset purchases in late 2008 and then added to it in 
March of 2009, it hadn't been done before and it was just being undertaken by a few other 
central banks like the Bank of England. “No one quite knew what was going to happen.” 
Economists outside the Fed warned of inflation and of the difficulty of tightening monetary 
policy when it was time to exit the unconventional programs. Neither risk materialized. Kohn 
observed that, 
But now that we have had that experience [with asset-purchases during the GFC], in 
2020, the Fed has moved aggressively with asset-purchase programs. I think certainly 
the inflation and exit issues shouldn’t hold back the Fed—and haven’t held back the 
Fed—over the last couple weeks.      
4. Provide forward guidance on interest rates in order to signal a policy reaction function 
that differs from history or market expectations. 
The Fed’s approach to forward guidance has evolved, Kohn said. In 2008, when the FOMC 
began to provide some forward guidance about its possible actions, it started with “some 
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vague words,” Kohn recalled. “Then, over time, I think the forward guidance was 
strengthened and tied more explicitly to emerging economic circumstances and even to 
specific dates.” He believes this was a very positive development: 
[Forward guidance became] a more powerful tool in the Fed’s toolkit as it became 
more sophisticated and more specific. I think you need to communicate to the market. 
It’s not so much about what’s happening right now. They can see what’s happening 
right now. I think the risk that we worried about, and that I think Brian [Sack] and I 
wrote about, was that the market would have these rates rising faster than the Fed 
intended to raise them once the economy began to recover. 
Kohn is of the opinion that providing forward guidance helps guard against the market acting 
prematurely on beliefs about future central bank actions. 
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